This submission outlines a number of areas for consideration when thinking about the issue of dealing with the past and reconciliation in societies coming out of conflict. It consists of four sections. First, the breadth of the notion of dealing with the past is considered. Second, the question of the issue of victims of political violence is discussed. Third, some points with regard to the idea of a truth commission for Northern Ireland are outlined. The submission then ends with the extraction of five broad lessons that may be helpful in thinking about dealing with the past in any society in transition.

1. Depth and width of the process of dealing with the past

Dealing with the past and building reconciliation is a long-term, deep and wide process. As such there are **multiple** (generally context specific) ways used to deal with the past in different countries. In a submission such as this it is difficult to outline all of these. Furthermore, research in Northern Ireland has shown that reconciliation is a multifaceted concept in itself and is also defined in different ways in different contexts. Although this submission makes extensive reference to the notion of a truth commission, it is important that we think about ‘dealing with the past’ as a process much wider than a narrow debate on truth commissions. One criticism I would have of the South African approach was an over-reliance on stressing the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) as the primary mechanism for dealing with the past, when clearly a **range** of mechanisms were going to be necessary over a long period of time.

The Healing Through Remembering consultation process heralded probably the most thorough public and civil society investigation to date of strategies for dealing with the past in Northern Ireland. Their consultation identified fourteen key approaches to dealing with the past. These include: storytelling and oral history; memorials; museums, exhibitions and art; public and collective commemorations; truth recovery processes; other forms of legal processes such as trials and inquiries; community and intercommunity interactions; support for individuals and victims; research and social policy development; a Centre for remembrance; a financial response, i.e. the establishment of a memorial fund for victims, and a satisfactory compensation system; education and training; supporting current remembering processes; and self-examination of institutions, and apologies.

More specifically, the Project recommends: (1) developing a living memorial museum; (2) establishing a day of reflection; (3) setting up a network of commemoration projects; (4) establishing a collective story-telling initiative; (5) establishing an initiative to take the recommendations forward; and (6) initiating an acknowledgment process towards truth recovery. In terms of truth recovery, the Project felt that a formal truth-recovery process should be given careful consideration, though only as **one part** of dealing with the past. Importantly, the HTR final Report stipulates that an important first step in a truth-recovery process is acknowledgement, by all, of acts of commission and/or omission.

I understand that the HTR project has made a separate submission to the Committee, but I mention it as I believe the breadth of the areas touched on by the Project’s Report—and the
different methods for dealing with the past referred to in their consultation as outlined above—highlight the various components that will need to be addressed to holistically deal with the past. I draw attention to them because some, if not all, will need to be addressed in one way or another in any society attempting to deal with the past and build reconciliation.

2. Victims and dealing with the past

Support services for victims of political violence are a critical component of dealing with the past. A long-term process of dealing with the needs of victims should be put in place—to date a range of steps for addressing the needs of victims have been set up in Northern Ireland. That said, state responses to the impact of the conflict in and about Northern Ireland have been criticised for being slow and limited. There was until recently a ‘policy silence’ in the areas of health, social services, education and other provisions for victims of the conflict. This has resulted in a legacy of distrust (especially of statutory services) within many community groups working with victims of the conflict. My research and that of others has shown that the process of supporting victims came fairly late in the day and initially was somewhat chaotic in its development, although the process is currently stabilising.

The biggest threat to support services in Northern Ireland remains the lack of commitment to fund and support victims over the long-term. International lessons suggest victims support needs to continue for decades and the two-year funding cycles for Victim Group Core Funding in Northern Ireland is inadequate in that regard. Many victim groups remain concerned about the possibility of long-term funding, sustainability and support. Although they hold fairly divergent views at this stage about how best to deal with the past (e.g. should there be a truth commission, a memorial listing all those killed in the conflict), most however would agree that ongoing support remains a priority.

Having said that, the provision of extensive counselling or setting up public health facilities, although welcome, do not fully address the wider notion of dealing with the past. Of course, victim support services are necessary. Victims need to be provided with the space to tell their stories, be heard and be officially acknowledged. However, when considering the notion of dealing with the past more broadly, we should not fall into the simplistic trap of arguing that revealing (telling the truth) or storytelling as it is sometimes called is instantly healing. Storytelling may be a necessary step, but testimony is not sufficient in itself to heal all victims, address the wounds of the past or deal with the past more generally.

My work over the years has routinely shown that victims are unlikely to divorce the questions of truth, justice, the labeling of responsibility for violations, compensation and official acknowledgement, from the healing process. Therein lies the challenge: setting up sufficient support services for all victims of political violence could be envisaged, but integrating their other needs—some perhaps overridden in the name of peace, such as the right to justice—is infinitely more complex.

Victim rights, and the intricate needs of individual survivors with regard to truth, justice and reparation, are often negated by compromises made to ensure peace (such as the release of political prisoners). As such governments and political parties may find themselves at odds with victims as political processes often move forward more rapidly than personal processes. If so, policymakers and governments will be required to deal as best they can with the legitimate frustrations of victims whose rights have been violated—a less than ideal position.
The denial of certain rights to victims often leads to the understandable desire by victims to want their pain to be legitimately heard. This sense of injustice is often at the heart of the conflict between different victim groups (and politicians) as to who are the “real” victims of the conflict. It has become common for some groups to refer to themselves as “real” or “innocent” victims in Northern Ireland. Individuals from different sides of the conflict have alleged that there is a hierarchy of victimhood, i.e. pointing out that their specific type of victimisation is given a lower level of official prioritisation than certain others. If we think of the injustices many have suffered, such a ‘competition’ for victimhood makes sense. That said there is a responsibility on politicians committed to peace to try to defuse this situation rather than play into it.

Brice Dickson of the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission provides some useful pointers in dealing with this situation. He notes that the nature of victimhood differs according to the nature of the wrong that has been committed against the victim. The wrong has two aspects to it: the act itself (e.g., the killing, the assault, the threat) and the consequences of the act (e.g., the death, the injury, the fear). If we are to decide what rights victims should have, he argues, we should have regard for both aspects. The former aspect calls for rights such as recognition, acknowledgement and apology. The latter aspect calls for rights such as compensation and access to services. The former is more politically contentious as usually acknowledgement and recognition are dealt with by truth commissions and other official processes.

Rights in relation to service delivery are more straightforward. It would appear that law could underpin rights to compensation and adequate services—the draft Bill of Rights in Northern Ireland supports this. The difficulty, however, comes when dealing with the complexity of needs of victims in transitional societies related to truth, justice, recognition and acknowledgement. Addressing such issues essentially requires political solutions and commitment to openness, transparency and public acknowledgment in some form (e.g. through reparation, apology, and political parties, paramilitaries, security forces and governments actively participating in peacebuilding initiatives and truth-recovery processes if necessary).

Having said that, victims’ rights in criminal justice studies, albeit somewhat developed, remain the poor relative to many other aspects of criminal justice the world over. In transitional justice studies the concept is almost non-existent. A more rigorous engagement with the issue of victims’ rights still needs to be developed and articulated. Focusing ongoing discussions concerning victims and dealing with the past within and about Northern Ireland in a rights discourse from the outset may be a useful starting point.

3. A truth commission for Northern Ireland?

Although victims need to be at the forefront of any policy for addressing the past, the question of dealing with the past and truth-recovery concerns wider society. In 1998 I undertook research on whether or not Northern Ireland should have a truth commission. I came to the conclusion that, at that time, an official truth recovery process seemed unlikely for Northern Ireland. Others made similar arguments; namely, that no moral or political authority existed to support an entity such as a truth commission. I further argued in my research that the balance of power between forces during transition generally determined government policy on issues and, in Northern Ireland, at that stage, the forces were too evenly weighed and all sides were opting to leave their truths hidden for the time being. As such:
Most political players demand truth from those they perceive as the other side or sides, but seem unwilling to offer the truth from their side, or acknowledge and take responsibility for their actions. This is mostly due to fear that such acknowledgement (public or otherwise) will weaken in the new dispensation and that the truth may be used against them within the context of the delicate peace that prevails. There are also those in Northern Ireland who refuse to accept that they did anything wrong or that their action (or inaction) was complicit in perpetuating the conflict.

Several years on, the endpoint has not shifted significantly, but the debate and the intricacies of dealing with the past have certainly gained political and public momentum. In addition, various mechanisms that one could broadly call ‘truth-recovery processes’ in some shape or form are underway. International lessons (e.g. the ongoing debates about the past in Chile, recent prosecutions and additional commissions years after the official truth commission) suggest a truth commission does not draw a line in the sand. It can merely help shape future debate hopefully more constructively. Michael Ignatieff feels truth commissions do not find the complete truth but rather narrow the opportunity for ‘permissible lies’ about the past. He is of the opinion that truth commissions can provide a frame for public discourse and memory. They create a new public space for an ongoing debate.

South Africa’s TRC was a bold attempt, first and foremost, to uncover the truth about what had happened in its past and, in a minority of cases, this did occur. The atrocities of the past were opened up for debate, examination and for lessons to be learnt. Each individual act of coming together (and there were several) or the few genuine acts of repentance seen during the process cannot be scoffed at in a deeply divided society. The TRC went a long way in naming individuals who were responsible for past atrocities and outlining the causes of the conflict and the wider historical context. It also taught some hard lessons about the complexity of dealing with a conflict-ridden past. It assisted in setting some accepted limits in the narrative of what happened to whom and, in this, reduced the range of permissible historical revisionism.

Several of the TRC’s recommendations or, more accurately, its calls for ongoing social, economic and political reform in South Africa are also informative. The South African government now and in the future would do well to measure its progress against many of the TRC’s recommendations. Several other institutions (following TRC hearings that focused specifically on them), including the media, the health sector, judiciary, churches and business were also implored to ensure the development of a more robust human rights culture within their structures, while ensuring that South Africa becomes a more equal society.

That said, the TRC’s amnesty provision meant that justice through the courts remains elusive for many victims. The granting of amnesty in exchange for truth remains a difficult issue to bear for many victims in South Africa. Lauding South Africa for its innovative approach—trading truth for amnesty—is meaningless without referring to its context. South Africa’s approach to reconciliation cannot be applied elsewhere without first analysing the power relations in that society and others. A truth commission granting amnesty as in the South African case is not usual practice, most focus on building a picture of the past, investigating unsolved cases and labeling responsibility, largely (but not exclusively) through the use of victim testimony.

Furthermore, truth commissions are generally used to *consolidate peace* after a formal agreement has been secured, *not to try to make peace*. The issue of timing in the incomplete
Northern Ireland process remains one of the biggest stumbling blocks at this point. This does not mean questions of truth and justice will disappear in Northern Ireland; they will need to be confronted, but when the time is right and when consensus on a method for doing this can be achieved.

The mandate of the South African TRC compelled it to investigate the ‘causes, nature and extent’ of the South African conflict. The TRC could have certainly ventured more boldly into the ‘nature and extent’ of the conflict. In addition, the TRC could have fostered a greater recognition of the need for multiple and ongoing mechanisms over time to continue truth finding and deliver justice in South Africa. However, the South African TRC certainly elucidated the broad causal and historical picture fairly well. This was obviously made easier by the fact that a widely accepted truth already existed, i.e., apartheid was a morally abhorrent system that brutalised many. But, on assessment, the TRC did not simply highlight the fact that apartheid was a crime against humanity—uncomfortable ‘truths’ of firmly held narratives about the South African conflict were challenged on all sides.

Contrary to this, the multitude of initiatives taking place in Northern Ireland, largely unofficial, mean that the ‘nature and extent’ of the conflict is fairly well documented. Ongoing projects and compilation of ‘victim lists’ have documented the extent of the conflict in Northern Ireland in great detail (although developing an official list of those injured and killed in the conflict would be a worthwhile endeavour).

However, unlike South Africa, agreeing on or at least having a broadly accepted narrative of the ‘causes’ of the Northern Ireland conflict is one of the biggest challenges to building some form of reconciliation into the future. The fear—not to mention complexity—of exploring the ‘causes’ in an open, honest and inclusive way is the principal obstacle to engaging in a macro truth finding process. Such a process, if designed correctly and impartially, would mean for all parties involved—including the governments, political parties, security forces, paramilitaries and the public at large—potentially compromising on long-held beliefs about the causes of the conflict, or at least being prepared to allow their own perspectives to be scrutinized, and perhaps proved mistaken or misguided. The challenge such a process might present is one of the reasons why many would not support the idea of a truth commission, but equally this could be the very reason for making such a recommendation.

**Conclusion: lessons learned**

This section briefly outlines some of the lessons from my research and work on transitional justice issues that may be relevant to the Committee’s work.

1. **Inclusivity, consensus and respecting victim rights:** Any initiative to deal with the past works best if it is broadly inclusive and is driven by consensus. Truth-recovery processes and in fact any strategy for dealing with the past are most effective when there is consensus on their remit and focus. This requires genuine consultation and a serious engagement with the issues at hand. Victims also need to have their say in such a process. Many may want to tell their stories and have them officially documented, something that some truth commissions have done particularly effectively. But equally it is naïve to think that most victims will be satisfied with this alone. Investigation and, potentially, prosecutions will be high on victims’ agendas if international experience is anything to go by. This needs to be respected and become part of the debate from the outset, as does the discussion on victim rights as was mentioned earlier.
2. **Victim-centred but society wide:** Any process of dealing with the past should not only focus on victims alone because the whole society generally has a responsibility to address the legacy of the past. Although processes for dealing with the past need to be victim-centred, the voting public more widely, governments, political parties, organisations, paramilitaries, security forces and public institutions need to be part of the process of dealing with the past. They all have a role in acknowledging the part they themselves played in the conflict and in finding ways to contribute to effectively addressing the consequences of conflict and meeting the needs of victims. The South African TRC sectoral hearings could be instructive in that regard.

3. **Transparency and public accountability:** Any process of remembering or dealing with the past needs to be transparent and publicly accountable. In South Africa, for example, the selection of truth commissioners was a public process. The public was asked to nominate individuals that they felt had a good human rights track record to be commissioners. These individuals, some three hundred, were then interviewed in public (by a selection panel selected by President Mandela) and in the full glare of television cameras. Their pasts were open to discussion if necessary and the public could send in questions to the panel if they wanted. Ultimately seventeen individuals were selected. In this way, the legitimacy of the commission was built from the start. This teaches us that transparency in selection process and operation is vital in truth-recovery related processes or any dealing with the past initiative.

4. **Authentic investment in uncovering the truth in a wide-ranging manner:** A genuine strategy for dealing with a violent past should not merely be set up for pragmatic and political reasons. There are a number of countries where truth commissions have been used as a way of ‘white-washing’ the past. There needs to be an authentic investment in uncovering the truth and dealing with the past as ways of learning lessons for the future. If one thinks of the example of a truth commission (as one mechanism for dealing with the past, of course), the discussion should not be narrowed at the outset (e.g. truth-recovery being discussed as something that is only dependent upon justice being relinquished as in the South African case, rather than a necessary process in itself). Some truth commissions have recommended prosecutions after their investigations. A creative and wide-ranging discussion is needed. As mentioned above, dealing with the past is long term and multifaceted, and cannot be reduced to one mechanism.

5. **Long-term commitment to reconciliation and not point-scoring:** Dealing with decades of conflict is long term, complex and time consuming. It will not entail a single approach or model, and the past cannot simply be put to rest. International lessons suggest it takes decades. There are no quick fixes. We should not rush into opinions on different methods before we have agreed that remembering, acknowledgement, truth and justice are important issues for victims and society at large. These are the principles from which any process needs to begin. The past can only be dealt with if all concerned enter the debate in an inclusive and sincere way, aimed at entrenching peace as the ultimate goal. The importance of getting this right should not be underestimated and political parties have a responsibility to create a conducive environment for such work to take place. More broadly, any discussion needs to be aimed at societal reconciliation and not point-scoring. If we do not first agree on the underlying principles (such as the importance of truth and justice or the rights of victims) all discussion will be contorted and subject to political wrangling. This will ultimately result in mechanisms that will continue the conflict by different means, rather than find ways to resolve it constructively.
Endnotes

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Many researchers and commentators mark the beginning of concerted government involvement in making policy for victims/survivors as beginning—for better or worse—with the Bloomfield Report appearing in May 1998, as well as the Wilson Report in the Republic of Ireland. These were state-sponsored initiatives aimed at making recommendations that could assist victims and recognise their suffering. The Bloomfield Report recommends further consideration of a central Northern Ireland memorial. It does not recommend a truth commission, but says this issue requires ongoing review. The Bloomfield Report, however, was met with mixed reactions. One criticism raised was that the report prioritised victims of paramilitary violence and did not pay sufficient attention to the victims of state violence. Since the Bloomfield Report there have been other government initiatives. A Victims’ Liaison Unit was set up in the Northern Ireland Office (NIO) in June 1998, and a Victims’ Unit in the Office of the First and Deputy First Minister as part of the Northern Ireland Assembly in July 2000. To date, the NIO and the Victims’ Unit of OFMDFM claims to have spent (or allocated) over £20 million on victim-related projects. From the EU, £5.8 million has been made available for so-called victims’ work for the period 2002-2004, although spending can continue to 2006. Most of these rather recent developments have been orientated towards community groups, i.e. mainly grassroots support to self-help groups and counselling organisations for victims. The launch of the Victim Strategy Document by the Victims’ Unit on 6 August 2001, from a policy perspective, is the most notable government development to date in terms of assisting victims. The document sets out to develop a ‘strategy to deliver practical help and services’ to victims. A range of other policy-orientated initiatives have also taken place. For example, reviews of the compensation scheme and of counselling were undertaken; victim representatives were nominated to the Civic Forum; a Memorial Fund was set up; the Human Rights Commission explored the possibility of including a specific focus on victims in the Bill of Rights; and victim issues were mentioned in the Northern Ireland Assembly’s Programme for Government. At the same time, over sixty victim groups, drawing from across the major political perspectives, have continued to actively operate. Their work is extensive and far-reaching, including service-delivery work such as counselling, befriending, and alternative therapies, as well as lobbying and advocacy. An initial £3 million Core Funding Scheme was set up, and a further £3 million was allocated for the work in 2003-2005 for these groups. A further two year extension is imminent.

See Hamilton, J., Thomson, K., & Smyth, M. (2002). Reviewing REAL Provision: An evaluation of provision and support for people affected by the Northern Ireland Troubles. Belfast: Northern Ireland Voluntary Trust.. This was also acknowledged by government, as Minister Des Browne noted “in all that time [thirty years of conflict] there were no policies in relation to victims.” See Irish Echo Online, February 19-25, 2003, Volume 76, Number 7.


It is interesting to note that Northern Ireland has at least to some degree and at this stage, tried to incorporate some rights-based views of victims’ rights in the draft Bill of Rights. The draft Bill reads, under the heading of ‘Victims of the Conflict’: ‘With a view to promoting the principles of truth and reconciliation in the aftermath of a lengthy period of conflict, the Government shall take legislative and other measures to ensure that the loss and suffering of all victims of that conflict and the responsibility of State and non-State participants are appropriately
and independently established and/or acknowledged’. See Human Rights Commission of Northern Ireland, Proposed Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland, Ct. 8(a)1 (Sept. 2001).


13 For example, the Bloody Sunday Inquiry was announced on 29 January 1998 and has been the most extensive public inquiry in British history (see http://www.bloody-sunday-inquiry.org/index.htm); a commission to investigate disappearances was also set up; four new inquiries into political murders are due to start soon; an inquiry into the origins of bomb attacks in Dublin and Monaghan in 1974 was set up by the Irish Government; and a number of ongoing legal matters have come before the European Court of Human Rights (See Ní Aoláin, F. (2002). Truth Telling Accountability and the Right to Life in Northern Ireland Issue. European Human Rights Law Review, 5, 572). There are also many ongoing community initiatives working with memorials, oral history and commemoration. Ongoing projects have also documented the extent of the conflict in Northern Ireland in great detail producing “victim lists”. Recently the Northern Ireland Chief Constable called for a truth commission, claiming that he did not have the resources to investigate all the unsolved cases. However, a few weeks later, £9 million was allocated (enough money for about 30 staff) by the British Government to investigate various unsolved cases in Northern Ireland, totaling over 2000. At the same time, the debate about whether Northern Ireland should have a truth commission continues. The British Secretary of State has announced a consultation process on the issue.

14 The Commission for Truth and Reconciliation (or Rettig Commission) was set up in 1990 under President Patricio Aylwin. The Commission’s findings were presented to the nation on 4th March 1991. In Chile, however, those initially protected from justice, by a 1978 amnesty decree, are being prosecuted. The courts no longer apply the amnesty to forced disappearance cases. A new political will to enforce justice is now seemingly evident thirty years after the military coup that overthrew the Allende government in 1973. In Chile, the previous amnesty laws have effectively been rendered null and void. Although the 1990 Chilean truth commission might have helped some victims tell their story and uncover some truth, many still want justice decades later. Society is finally obliging.


18 The South African TRC held ‘institutional hearings’ in which influential sectors of society (e.g. the medical and health professions, judiciary, business community, churches, media) were publicly questioned on the way they contributed (or prevented) the creation of an environment conducive to human rights violations. Findings were made against various sectors, as well as recommendations for how they could improve the situation in the future.